Edition used: Samuel von Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature, trans. Andrew Tooke, ed. Ian Hunter and David Saunders, with Two Discourses and a Commentary by Jean Barbeyrac, trans. David Saunders (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003). Available in the following formats: 1.64 MB This text-based PDF was prepared by the typesetters of the LF book. 1.25 MB This text-based PDF or EBook was created from the HTML version of this book and is part of the Portable Library of Liberty. 1.14 MB This version has been converted from the original text.

Every effort has been taken to translate the unique features of the printed book into the HTML medium. 1.14 MB This is a simplifed HTML format, intended for screen readers and other limited-function browsers. About this Title: The Whole Duty of Man (first published in Latin in 1673), was among the first works to suggest a purely conventional basis for natural law. Rejecting scholasticism’s metaphysical theories, Pufendorf found the source of natural law in humanity’s need to cultivate sociability. This edition also includes he very important editorial material from Jean Barbeyrac’s French editions and are here translated into English for the first time. Copyright information: The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc. Fair use statement: This material is put online to further the educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc.

Unless otherwise stated in the Copyright Information section above, this material may be used freely for educational and academic purposes. It may not be used in any way for profit. Table of Contents: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •. This book is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a foundation established to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.

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07 06 05 04 03 c 5 4 3 2 1 07 06 05 04 03 p 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pufendorf, Samuel, Freiherr von, 1632–1694. [De officio hominis et civis. English] The whole duty of man according to the law of nature/Samuel Pufendorf; translated by Andrew Tooke, 1691; edited with an Introduction by Ian Hunter and David Saunders.

Two discourses and a commentary/by Jean Barbeyrac; translated by David Saunders. — (Natural law and enlightenment classics) Works by Jean Barbeyrac translated from the French. Includes bibliographical references and index. Isbn 0-86597-374-1 (hc: alk. Paper)— isbn 0-86597-375-X (pb: alk.

Hunter, Ian, 1949– II. Saunders, David, 1940– III. Barbeyrac, Jean, 1674–1744. Two discourses and a commentary. Title: Two discourses and a commentary. K457.P8 D4313 2002 340′112—dc042 liberty fund, inc.

8335 Allison Pointe Trail, Suite 300 Indianapolis, Indiana Edition: current; Page: [vii ]. THE WHOLE DUTY of MAN According to the LAW OF NATURE. By that famous Civilian SAMUEL PUFENDORF, Professor of The Law of Nature and Nations, in the University of Heidelberg, and in the Caroline University, afterwards Counsellor and Historiographer to the King of Sweden, and to his Electoral Highness of Brandenburgh. Now made ENGLISH. The Fifth Edition with the Notes of Mr.

Barbeyrac, and many other Additions and Amendments; And also an Index of the Matters. By ANDREW TOOKE, M.A. Late Professor of Geometry in Gresham-College. Nunquam aliud Natura, aliud Sapientia dicit.

LONDON: Printed for R. Gosling, at the Mitre and Crown; J.

Pemberton, at the Golden Buck; and B. Motte, at the Middle-Temple-Gate, Fleet-Street.

Edition: current; Page: [4 ] Edition: current; Page: [5 ]. To the reader The Translator having observed, in most of the Disputes wherewith the present Age is disquieted, frequent Appeals made, and that very properly, from Laws and Ordinances of a meaner Rank to the everlasting Law of Nature, gave himself the Pains to turn over several Writers on that Subject. He chanced, he thinks with great Reason, to entertain an Opinion, that this Author was the clearest, the fullest, and the most unprejudiced of any he met with: And hereupon, that he might the better possess himself of his Reasonings, he attempted to render the Work into Mother-Tongue, after he had first endeavoured to set several better Hands upon the Undertaking, who all for one Reason or other declined the Toil.

He thought when ’twas done, it might be as acceptable to one or other to read it, as it had been to himself to translate it. Contents • book 1 • Chap. Of Human Actions Page • II. Of the Rule of Human Actions, or of Laws in general • III. Of the Law of Nature • IV. Of the Duty of Man towards God, or concerning Natural Religion • V.

Of the Duty of Man towards himself • VI. Of the Duty of one Man towards another, and first, of doing no Injury to any Man • VII. The Natural Equality of Men to be acknowledged • VIII. Of the mutual Duties of Humanity • IX.

The Duty of Men in making Contracts • X. The Duty of Men in Discourse • XI. The Duty of those that take an Oath • XII. Duties to be observ’d in acquiring Possession of Things • XIII. The Duties which naturally result from Man’s Property in Things Edition: current; Page: [12 ] • XIV. Of the Price and Value of Things • XV.

Of those Contracts in which the Value of Things is presupposed, and of the Duties thence arising • XVI. The several Methods by which the Obligations arising from Contracts are dissolved • XVII. Of Meaning or Interpretation • book ii • Chap. Of the natural State of Men • II.

Of the Duties of the married State • III. The Duty of Parents and Children • IV. The Duties of Masters and Servants • V. The impulsive Cause of Constituting Communities • VI. Of the Internal Frame and Constitution of any State or Government • VII. Of the several Parts of Government • VIII. Of the several Forms of Government • IX.

The Qualifications of Civil Government • X. How Government, especially Monarchical, is acquired • XI. The Duty of supreme Governours • XII. Of the special Laws of a Community • XIII.

Of the Power of Life and Death • XIV. Of Reputation • XV. Of the Power of Governours over the Goods of their Subjects Edition: current; Page: [13 ] • XVI. Of War and Peace • XVII. Of Alliances • XVIII. The Duty of Subjects Edition: current; Page: [14 ] Edition: current; Page: [15 ]. Chapter i: Of Human Actions in general, the Principles of ’em, and how to be accounted for, or imputed I.

What Duty is.What we mean here by the Word Duty, is, That Action of a Man, which is regularly order’d according to some prescrib’d Law, which he is oblig’d to obey. To the Understanding whereof it is necessary to premise somewhat, as well touching the Nature of a Human Action, as concerning Laws in general. What a Human Action.By a Human Action we mean not every Motion that proceeds from the Faculties of a Man; but such only as have their Original and Direction from those Faculties which God Almighty has endow’d Mankind withal, distinct from Brutes; that is, such as are undertaken by the Light of the Understanding, and the Choice of the Will.

Edition: current; Page: [28 ] III. Human Capacity. Knowing and Chusing L. §1.For it is not only put in the Power of Man to know the various Things which appear in the World, to compare them one with another, and from thence to form to himself new Notions; but he is able to look forwards, and to consider what he is to do, and to carry himself to the Performance of it, and this to do after some certain Manner, and to some certain End; and then he can collect what will be the Consequence thereof. Beside, he can make a Judgment upon Things already done, whether they are done agreeably to their Rule.

Not that all a Man’s Faculties do exert themselves continually, or after the same manner, but some of them are stir’d up in him by an internal Impulse; and when rais’d, are by the same regulated and guided. Neither beside has a Man the same Inclination to every Object; but some he Desires, and for others he has an Aversion: And often, though an Object of Action be before him, yet he suspends any Motion towards it; and when many Objects offer themselves, he chuses one and refuses the rest.

Human Understanding. 3.As for that Faculty therefore of comprehending and judging of Things, which is called the Understanding; it must be taken for granted, first of all, That every Man of a mature Age, and entire Sense, has so much Natural Light in him, as that, with necessary Care, and due Consideration, he may rightly comprehend, at least those general Precepts and Principles which are requisite in order to pass our Lives here honestly and quietly; and be able to judge that these are congruous to the Nature of Man. For if this, at least, be not admitted within the Bounds of the Edition: current; Page: [29 ] Forum Humanum, [or Civil Judicature] Men might pretend an invincible Ignorance for all their Miscarriages; because no Man in foro humano can be condemn’d for having violated a Law which it was above his Capacity to comprehend. What is meant by Conscience rightly inform’d, and what by Probable Conscience.

§5.The Understanding of Man, when it is rightly instructed concerning that which is to be done or omitted, and this so, as that he is able to give certain and undoubted Reasons for his Opinions, is wont to be call’d Conscience rightly inform’d: That is, govern’d by sure Principles, and settling its Resolutions conformably to the Laws. But when a Man has indeed entertain’d the true Opinion about what is to be done or not to be done, the Truth whereof yet he is not able to make good by Reasoning; but he either drew such his Notion from his Education, way of Living, Custom, or from the Authority of Persons wiser or better than himself; and no Reason appears to him that can persuade the contrary, this uses to be call’d Conscientia probabilis, Conscience grounded upon Probability. And by this the greatest part of Mankind are govern’d, it being the good Fortune of few to be able to enquire into, and to know, the Causes of Things. Conscience doubting.

§8.And yet it chances often, to some Men especially in singular Cases, that Arguments may be brought on both sides, and they not be Masters of sufficient Judgment to discern clearly which are the strongest and most weighty. And this is call’d a Doubting Conscience. In which Case this is the Rule: As long as the Understanding is unsatisfied and in doubt, Edition: current; Page: [30 ] whether the thing to be done be good or evil, the doing of it is to be deferr’d. For to set ab.

The touchstone of the value of philosophy as a world-view and methodology is the degree to which it is interconnected with life. This interconnection may be both direct and indirect, through the whole system of culture, through science, art, morality, religion, law, and politics. As a special form of social consciousness, constantly interacting with all its other forms, philosophy is their general theoretical substantiation and interpretation. Can philosophy develop by itself, without the support of science? Can science 'work' without philosophy? Some people think that the sciences can stand apart from philosophy, that the scientist should actually avoid philosophising, the latter often being understood as groundless and generally vague theorising. If the term philosophy is given such a poor interpretation, then of course anyone would agree with the warning 'Physics, beware of metaphysics!'

But no such warning applies to philosophy in the higher sense of the term. The specific sciences cannot and should not break their connections with true philosophy. Science and philosophy have always learned from each other. Philosophy tirelessly draws from scientific discoveries fresh strength, material for broad generalisations, while to the sciences it imparts the world-view and methodological im pulses of its universal principles.

Many general guiding ideas that lie at the foundation of modern science were first enunciated by the perceptive force of philosophical thought. One example is the idea of the atomic structure of things voiced by Democritus. Certain conjectures about natural selection were made in ancient times by the philosopher Lucretius and later by the French thinker Diderot. Hypothetically he anticipated what became a scientific fact two centuries later.

We may also recall the Cartesian reflex and the philosopher's proposition on the conservation of motion in the universe. On the general philosophical plane Spinoza gave grounds for the universal principle of determinism. The idea of the existence of molecules as complex particles consisting of atoms was developed in the works of the French philosopher Pierre Gassendi and also Russia's Mikhail Lomonosov.

Philosophy nurtured the hypothesis of the cellular structure of animal and vegetable organisms and formulated the idea of the development and universal connection of phenomena and the principle of the material unity of the world. Lenin formulated one of the fundamental ideas of contemporary natural science—the principle of the inexhaustibility of matter—upon which scientists rely as a firm methodological foundation. The latest theories of the unity of matter, motion, space and time, the unity of the discontinuous and continuous, the principles of the conservation of matter and motion, the ideas of the infinity and inexhaustibility of matter were stated in a general form in philosophy. Besides influencing the development of the specialised fields of knowledge, philosophy itself has been substantially enriched by progress in the concrete sciences. Every major scientific discovery is at the same time a step forward in the development of the philosophical world-view and methodology. Philosophical statements are based on sets of facts studied by the sciences and also on the system of propositions, principles, concepts and laws discovered through the generalisation of these facts. The achievements of the specialised sciences are summed up in philosophical statements.

Euclidian geometry, the mechanics of Galileo and Newton, which have influenced men's minds for centuries, were great achievements of human reason which played 'a significant role in forming world-views and methodology. And what an intellectual revolution was produced by Copernicus' heliocentric system, which changed the whole conception of the structure of the universe, or by Darwin's theory of evolution, which had a profound impact on biological science in general and our whole conception of man's place in nature. Mendeleyev's brilliant system of chemical elements deepened our understanding of the structure of matter.

Einstein's theory of relativity changed our notion of the relationship between matter, motion, space and time. Quantum mechanics revealed hitherto unknown world of microparticles of matter. The theory of higher nervous activity evolved by Sechenov and Pavlov deepened our understanding of the material foundations of mental activity, of consciousness. Cybernetics revealed new horizons for an understanding of the phenomena of information interactions, the principles of control in living systems, in technological devices and in society, and also the principles of feedback, the man-machine system, and so on. And what philosophically significant pictures have been presented to us by genetics, which deepened our understanding of the relationship between the biological and the social in man, a relationship that has revealed the subtle mechanisms of heredity.

The creation and development by Marx, Engels and Lenin of the science of the laws of development of human society, which has changed people's view of their place in the natural and social vortex of events, holds a special place in this constellation of achievements of human reason. If we trace the whole history of natural and social science, we cannot fail to notice that scientists in their specific researches, in constructing hypotheses and theories have constantly applied, sometimes unconsciously, world-views and methodological principles, categories and logical systems evolved by philosophers and absorbed by scientists in the process of their training and self-education. All scientists who think in terms of theory constantly speak of this with a deep feeling of gratitude both in their works and at regional and international conferences and congresses.

So the connection between philosophy and science is mutual and characterised by their ever deepening interaction. Some people think that science has reached such a level of theoretical thought that it no longer needs philosophy.

But any scientist, particularly the theoretician, knows in his heart that his creative activity is closely linked with philosophy and that without serious knowledge of philosophical culture the results of that activity cannot become theoretically effective. All the outstanding theoreticians have themselves been guided by philosophical thought and tried to inspire their pupils with its beneficent influence in order to make them specialists capable of comprehensively and critically analysing all the principles and systems known to science, discovering their internal contradictions and overcoming them by means of new concepts. Real scientists, and by this we usually mean scientists with a powerful theoretical grasp, have never turned their backs on philosophy. Truly scientific thought is philosophical to the core, just as truly philosophical thought is profoundly scientific, rooted in the sum-total of scientific achievements Philosophical training gives the scientist a breadth and penetration, a wider scope in posing and resolving problems. Sometimes these qualities are brilliantly expressed, as in the work of Marx, particularly in his Capital, or in Einstein's wide-ranging natural scientific conceptions. The common ground of a substantial part of the content of science, its facts and laws has always related it to philosophy, particularly in the field of the theory of knowl edge, and today this common ground links it with the problems of the moral and social aspects of scientific discoveries and technical inventions.

This is understandable enough. Uttaran Tv Serial Full Story. Today too many gifted minds are oriented on destructive goals. In ancient times, as we have seen, nearly every notable scientist was at the same time a philosopher and every philosopher was to some extent a scientist.

The connection between science and philosophy has endured for thousands of years. In present-day conditions it has not only been preserved but is also growing substantially stronger.

The scale of the scientific work and the social significance of research have acquired huge proportions. For example, philosophy and physics were at first organically interconnected, particularly in the work of Galileo, Descartes, Kepler, Newton, Lomonosov, Mendeleyev and Einstein, and generally in the work of all scientists with a broad outlook.

At one time it was commonly held that philosophy was the science of sciences, their supreme ruler. Today physics is regarded as the queen of sciences. Both views contain a certain measure of truth. Physics with its tradition, the specific objects of study and vast range of exact methods of observation and experiment exerts an exceptionally fruitful influence on all or nearly all spheres of knowledge. Philosophy may be called the 'science of sciences' probably in the sense that it is, in effect, the self-awareness of the sciences and the source from which all the sciences draw their world-view and methodological principles, which in the course of centuries have been honed down into concise forms.

As a whole, philosophy and the sciences are equal partners assisting creative thought in its explorations to attain generalising truth. Philosophy does not replace the specialised sciences and does not command them, but it does arm them with general principles of theoretical thinking, with a method of cognition and world-view. In this sense scientific philosophy legitimately holds one of the key positions in the system of the sciences. To artificially isolate the specialised sciences from philosophy amounts to condemning scientists to finding for themselves world-view and methodological guidelines for their researches.

Ignorance of philosophical culture is bound to have a negative effect on any general theoretical conclusions from a given set of scientific facts. One cannot achieve any real theoretical comprehension, particularly of the global problems of a specialised science, without a broad grasp of inter-disciplinary and philosophical views. The specialised scientists who ignore philosophical problems sometimes turn out to be in thrall to completely obsolete or makeshift philosophical ideas without even knowing it themselves. The desire to ignore philosophy is particularly characteristic of such a trend in bourgeois thought as positivism, whose advocates have claimed that science has no need of philosophy. Their ill-considered principle is that 'science is in itself philosophy'.

They work on the assumption that scientific knowledge has developed widely enough to provide answers to all philosophical problems without resorting to any actual philosophical system. But the 'cunning' of philosophy lies in the fact that any form of contempt for it, any rejection of philosophy is in itself a kind of philosophy. It is as impossible to get rid of philosophy as it is to rid oneself of all convictions. Philosophy is the regulative nucleus of the theoretically-minded individual. Philosophy takes its revenge on those who dissociate themselves from it. This can be seen from the example of a number of scientists who after maintaining the positions of crude empiricism and scorning philosophy have eventually fallen into mysticism.

So, calls for freedom from any philosophical assumptions are a sign of intellectual narrowness. The positivists, while denying philosophy in words, actually preach the flawed philosophy of agnosticism and deny the possibility of knowing the laws of existence, particularly those of the development of society.

This is also a philosophy, but one that is totally misguided and also socially harmful. It may appear to some scientists that they are using the logical and methodological means evolved strictly within the framework of their particular speciality. But this is a profound delusion.

In reality every scientist, whether he realises it or not, even in simple acts of theoretical thought, makes use of the overall results of the development of mankind's cognitive activity enshrined mainly in the philosophical categories, which we absorb as we are absorbing our own natural that no man can put together any theoretical statement language, and later, the special language of theoretical thought. Oversimplifying the question a little, one may say without such concepts as property, cause, law or accident. But these are, in fact, philosophical categories evolved by the whole history of human thought and particularly in the system of philosophical, logical culture based on the experience of all fields of knowledge and practice. Knowledge of the course and results of the historical development of cognition, of the philosophical views that have been held at various times of the world's universal objective connections is also essential for theoretical thinking because it gives the scientist a reliable yardstick for assessing the hypotheses and theories that he himself produces.

Everything is known through comparison. Philosophy plays a tremendous integrating role in scientific knowledge, particular ly in the present age, when knowledge has formed an extremely ramified system. Suffice it to say, for example, that medicine alone comprises some 300 specialised branches. Medicine has 'scalpelled' man into hundreds of little parts, which have become the targets of independent investigation and treatment.

Sciences have become so ramified that no brain, however versatile can master all their branches, or even one chosen field. No one nowadays can say that he knows the whole of medicine or biology or mathematics, as some people could have said in the past. Like Goethe's Faust, scientists realise that they cannot know everything about everything. So they are trying to know as much as possible about as little as possible and becoming like people digging deeper and deeper into a well and seeing less and less of what is going on around them, or like a chorus of the deaf, in which each member sings his own tune without hearing anyone else. Such narrow specialisation may lead, and has in some cases already led, to professional narrow-mindedness. Here we have a paradox.

This process is both harmful and historically necessary and justified. Without narrow specialisation we cannot make progress and at the same time such specialisation must be constantly filled out by a broad inter-disciplinary approach, by the integrative power of philosophical reason.

Otherwise a situation may arise when the common front of developing science will move ahead more and more rapidly and humanity's total knowledge will increase while the individual, the scientist, for example, will lag farther and farther behind the general flood of information and become more and more limited as the years go. Aristotle knew nearly everything that was known to his epoch and constituted the substance of ancient science, but today by the time he leaves school the pupil is expected to know far more than Aristotle. And it would be a lifetime's work even for a gifted person with a phenomenal memory to learn the fundamentals of all the sciences. What is more, narrow specialisation, deprived of any breadth of vision, inevitably leads to a creeping empiricism, to the endless description of particulars. What are we to do about assembling integral knowledge? Such an assembly can nevertheless be built by the integrative power of philosophy, which is the highest form of generalisation of all human knowledge and life experience, the sum-total of the development of world history.

By means of philosophy the human reason synthesises the results of human knowledge of nature, society, man and his self-awareness, which gives people a sense of freedom, an open-ended view of the world, an understanding of what is to be found beyond the limits of his usual occupation and narrow professional interests.